Environmental Research Joint Ventures and Time-Consistent Emission Tax

Yasunori Ouchida () and Daisaku Goto

No 166524, Climate Change and Sustainable Development from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)

Abstract: This paper presents an examination of the socially efficient formation of environmental R&D in Cournot duopoly in a setting where a regulator has no precommitment ability for an emission tax. The results reveal that if the environmental damage is slight, alternatively, given severe environmental damage and large inefficiency in environmental R&D costs, then environmental research joint venture (ERJV) cartelization is socially efficient. However, if environmental damage is severe, and if a firm’s R&D costs are limited, then, in stark contrast to results of previous studies, environmental R&D competition is socially more efficient than the other three scenarios (i.e., environmental R&D cartelization, ERJV competition, and ERJV cartelization), although R&D competition is the case of “NO information sharing and NO R&D coordination.”

Keywords: Environmental; Economics; and; Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23
Date: 2014-03
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https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/166524/files/NDL2014-035.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Environmental Research Joint Ventures and Time-Consistent Emission Tax (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:feemcl:166524

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.166524

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