Environmental Research Joint Ventures and Time-Consistent Emission Tax

Yasunori Ouchida () and Daisaku Goto

No 2014.35, Working Papers from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei

Abstract: This paper presents an examination of the socially efficient formation of environmental R&D in Cournot duopoly in a setting where a regulator has no precommitment ability for an emission tax. The results reveal that if the environmental damage is slight, alternatively, given severe environmental damage and large inefficiency in environmental R&D costs, then environmental research joint venture (ERJV) cartelization is socially efficient. However, if environmental damage is severe, and if a firm’s R&D costs are limited, then, in stark contrast to results of previous studies, environmental R&D competition is socially more efficient than the other three scenarios (i.e., environmental R&D cartelization, ERJV competition, and ERJV cartelization), although R&D competition is the case of “NO information sharing and NO R&D coordination.”

Keywords: Environmental Research Joint Venture; Environmental R&D; Time-consistent Emission Tax; Competition Policy; Cournot Duopoly (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L13 O32 Q55 Q58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-env, nep-ino, nep-pbe and nep-res
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
https://feem-media.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/w ... oads/NDL2014-035.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Environmental Research Joint Ventures and Time-Consistent Emission Tax (2014)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fem:femwpa:2014.35

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Alberto Prina Cerai ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).