A Taxonomy of Myopic Stability Concepts for Hedonic Games

Shao Chin Sung and Dinko Dimitrov

No 12168, Coalition Theory Network Working Papers from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)

Abstract: We present a taxonomy of myopic stability concepts for hedonic games in terms of deviations, and discuss the status of the existence problems of stable coalition tructures. In particular, we show that contractual strictly core stable coalition tructures always exist, and provide sufficient conditions for the existence of contractually Nash stable and weak individually stable coalition structures on the class of separable games.

Keywords: Institutional; and; Behavioral; Economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 20
Date: 2006
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Working Paper: A taxonomy of myopic stability concepts for hedonic games (2011)
Working Paper: A Taxonomy of Myopic Stability Concepts for Hedonic Games (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:feemct:12168

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.12168

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