A Taxonomy of Myopic Stability Concepts for Hedonic Games

Dinko Dimitrov and Shao Chin Sung
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Shao Chin Sung: Aoyama Gakuin University

No 2006.10, Working Papers from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei

Abstract: We present a taxonomy of myopic stability concepts for hedonic games in terms of deviations, and discuss the status of the existence problems of stable coalition tructures. In particular, we show that contractual strictly core stable coalition tructures always exist, and provide su¢ cient conditions for the existence of con- ractually Nash stable and weak individually stable coalition structures on the class of separable games.

Keywords: Coalition formation; Hedonic games; Separability; Taxonomy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A14 C71 D20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Working Paper: A taxonomy of myopic stability concepts for hedonic games (2011)
Working Paper: A Taxonomy of Myopic Stability Concepts for Hedonic Games (2006)
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