A Solution to Matching with Preferences over Colleagues

Federico Echenique and M. Bumin Yenmez

No 12174, Coalition Theory Network Working Papers from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)

Abstract: We study many-to-one matchings, such as the assignment of students to colleges, where the students have preferences over the other students who would attend the same college. It is well known that the core of this model may be empty, without strong assumptions on agents' preferences. We introduce a method that finds all core matchings, if any exist. The method requires no assumptions on preferences. Our method also finds certain partial solutions that may be useful when the core is empty.

Keywords: Institutional; and; Behavioral; Economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 38
Date: 2005
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/12174/files/wp050120.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: A solution to matching with preferences over colleagues (2007)
Working Paper: A Solution to Matching with Preferences over Colleagues (2005)
Working Paper: A Solution to Matching with Preferences over Colleagues (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:feemct:12174

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.12174

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