A Solution to Matching with Preferences over Colleagues

Federico Echenique

Game Theory and Information from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We study many-to-one matchings, such as the assignment of students to colleges, where the students have preferences over the other students who would attend the same college. It is well known that the core of this model may be empty, without strong assumptions on agents' preferences. We introduce a method that finds all core matchings, if any exist. The method requires no assumptions on preferences. Our method also finds certain partial solutions that may be useful when the core is empty.

Keywords: Two-sided Matching; Core; Externalities; Lattice; Tarski's Fixed Point Theorem; Gale-Shapley Algorithm (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 2005-06-20
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 28
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Journal Article: A solution to matching with preferences over colleagues (2007)
Working Paper: A Solution to Matching with Preferences over Colleagues (2005)
Working Paper: A Solution to Matching with Preferences over Colleagues (2005)
Working Paper: A Solution to Matching with Preferences over Colleagues (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0506005

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