Coalition Formation in Simple Games: The Semistrict Core

Dinko Dimitrov and Claus-Jochen Haake

No 12175, Coalition Theory Network Working Papers from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)

Abstract: We consider the class of proper monotonic simple games and study coalition formation when an exogenous share vector and a solution concept are combined to guide the distribution of coalitional worth. Using a multiplicative composite solution, we induce players' preferences over coalitions in a hedonic game, and present conditions under which the semistrict core of the game is nonempty.

Keywords: Political; Economy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21
Date: 2006
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Working Paper: Coalition Formation in Simple Games: The Semistrict Core (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:feemct:12175

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.12175

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