Coalition Formation in Simple Games: The Semistrict Core

Dinko Dimitrov and Claus-Jochen Haake ()

No 2006.72, Working Papers from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei

Abstract: We consider the class of proper monotonic simple games and study coalition formation when an exogenous share vector and a solution concept are combined to guide the distribution of coalitional worth. Using a multiplicative composite solution, we induce players' preferences over coalitions in a hedonic game, and present conditions under which the semistrict core of the game is nonempty.

Keywords: Coalition Formation; Paradox of Smaller Coalitions; Semistrict Core; Simple Games; Winning Coalitions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Working Paper: Coalition Formation in Simple Games: The Semistrict Core (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fem:femwpa:2006.72

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