A Social Network Analysis of Occupational Segregation

Marco van der Leij and Ioan Sebastian Buhai

No 6224, Coalition Theory Network Working Papers from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)

Abstract: We develop a social network model of occupational segregation between different social groups, generated by the existence of positive inbreeding bias among individuals from the same group. If network referrals are important for job search, then expected homophily in the contact network structure induces different career choices for individuals from different social groups. This further translates into stable occupational segregation equilibria in the labor market. We derive the conditions for wage and unemployment inequality in the segregation equilibria and characterize first and second best social welfare optima. Surprisingly, we find that socially optimal policies involve segregation.

Keywords: Institutional and Behavioral Economics; Labor and Human Capital (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 45
Date: 2008-03
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Related works:
Journal Article: A Social Network Analysis of Occupational Segregation (2023)
Working Paper: A Social Network Analysis of Occupational Segregation (2022)
Working Paper: A Social Network Analysis of Occupational Segregation (2010)
Working Paper: A Social Network Analysis of Occupational Segregation (2008)
Working Paper: A Social Network Analysis of Occupational Segregation (2006)
Working Paper: A Social Network Analysis of Occupational Segregation (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:feemct:6224

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.6224

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