The Maximal Payoff and Coalition Formation in Coalitional Games

Jingang Zhao

No 6298, Coalition Theory Network Working Papers from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)

Abstract: This paper first establishes a new core theorem using the concept of generated payoffs: the TU (transferable utility) core is empty if and only if the maximum of generated payoffs (mgp) is greater than the grand coalition’s payoff v(N), or if and only if it is irrational to split v(N). It then provides answers to the questions of what payoffs to split, how to split the payoff, what coalitions to form, and how long each of the coalitions will be formed by rational players in coalitional TU games. Finally, it obtains analogous results in coalitional NTU (non-transferable utility) games.

Keywords: Institutional and Behavioral Economics; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29
Date: 2008-03
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/6298/files/wp080027.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: The Maximal Payoff and Coalition Formation in Coalitional Games (2008)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:feemct:6298

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.6298

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Coalition Theory Network Working Papers from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by AgEcon Search ().