The Maximal Payoff and Coalition Formation in Coalitional Games

Jingang Zhao

No 2008.27, Working Papers from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei

Abstract: This paper first establishes a new core theorem using the concept of generated payoffs: the TU (transferable utility) core is empty if and only if the maximum of generated payoffs (mgp) is greater than the grand coalition’s payoff v(N), or if and only if it is irrational to split v(N). It then provides answers to the questions of what payoffs to split, how to split the payoff, what coalitions to form, and how long each of the coalitions will be formed by rational players in coalitional TU games. Finally, it obtains analogous results in coalitional NTU (non-transferable utility) games.

Keywords: Coalition Formation; Core; Maximal Payoff; Minimum No-Blocking Payoff (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C62 C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-gth
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://feem-media.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/w ... oads/NDL2008-027.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: The Maximal Payoff and Coalition Formation in Coalitional Games (2008)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fem:femwpa:2008.27

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Alberto Prina Cerai ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).