Core-stable Rings in Second Price Auctions with Common Values

Francoise Forges and Ram Orzach

No 96668, Sustainable Development Papers from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)

Abstract: In a common value auction in which the information partitions of the bidders are connected, all rings are core-stable. More precisely, the ex ante expected utilities of rings, at the (noncooperative) sophisticated equilibrium proposed by Einy, Haimanko, Orzach and Sela (Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2002), describe a cooperative game, in characteristic function form, in spite of the underlying strategic externalities. A ring is core-stable if the core of this characteristic function is not empty. Furthermore, every ring can implement its sophisticated equilibrium strategy by means of an incentive compatible mechanism.

Keywords: Environmental; Economics; and; Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 26
Date: 2010-11
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Related works:
Journal Article: Core-stable rings in second price auctions with common values (2011)
Working Paper: Core-stable rings in second price auctions with common values (2011)
Working Paper: Core-stable Rings in Second Price Auctions with Common Values (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:feemdp:96668

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.96668

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