Core-stable Rings in Second Price Auctions with Common Values

Francoise Forges and Ram Orzach
Additional contact information
Ram Orzach: Oakland University

No 2010.119, Working Papers from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei

Abstract: In a common value auction in which the information partitions of the bidders are connected, all rings are core-stable. More precisely, the ex ante expected utilities of rings, at the (noncooperative) sophisticated equilibrium proposed by Einy, Haimanko, Orzach and Sela (Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2002), describe a cooperative game, in characteristic function form, in spite of the underlying strategic externalities. A ring is core-stable if the core of this characteristic function is not empty. Furthermore, every ring can implement its sophisticated equilibrium strategy by means of an incentive compatible mechanism.

Keywords: Auctions; Bayesian Game; Collusion; Core; Partition Form Game; Characteristic Function (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C72 D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-gth and nep-hpe
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://feem-media.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com/w ... oads/ndl2010-119.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Core-stable rings in second price auctions with common values (2011)
Working Paper: Core-stable rings in second price auctions with common values (2011)
Working Paper: Core-stable Rings in Second Price Auctions with Common Values (2010)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fem:femwpa:2010.119

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Alberto Prina Cerai ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).