Tinbergen and Theil Meet Nash: Controllability in Policy Games

Giovanni Di Bartolomeo () and Nicola Acocella ()

No 12178, Economic Theory and Applications Working Papers from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)

Abstract: This paper generalizes the classical theory of economic policy to a static LQ-strategic context between n players. We show how this generalized version of controllability can profitably be used to deal with policy ineffectiveness issues and Nash equilibrium existence.

Keywords: Agricultural; and; Food; Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 19
Date: 2005
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https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/12178/files/wp050132.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Tinbergen and Theil meet Nash: Controllability in policy games (2006)
Working Paper: Tinbergen and Theil Meet Nash: Controllability in Policy Games (2005)
Working Paper: TINBERGEN AND THEIL MEET NASH: CONTROLLABILITY IN POLICY GAMES (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:feemet:12178

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.12178

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