Tinbergen and Theil Meet Nash: Controllability in Policy Games
Giovanni Di Bartolomeo () and
No 12178, Economic Theory and Applications Working Papers from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
This paper generalizes the classical theory of economic policy to a static LQ-strategic context between n players. We show how this generalized version of controllability can profitably be used to deal with policy ineffectiveness issues and Nash equilibrium existence.
Keywords: Agricultural; and; Food; Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Journal Article: Tinbergen and Theil meet Nash: Controllability in policy games (2006)
Working Paper: Tinbergen and Theil Meet Nash: Controllability in Policy Games (2005)
Working Paper: TINBERGEN AND THEIL MEET NASH: CONTROLLABILITY IN POLICY GAMES (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:feemet:12178
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