Tinbergen and Theil Meet Nash: Controllability in Policy Games
Giovanni Di Bartolomeo () and
No 2005.132, Working Papers from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei
This paper generalizes the classical theory of economic policy to a static LQ-strategic context between n players. We show how this generalized version of controllability can profitably be used to deal with policy ineffectiveness issues and Nash equilibrium existence.
Keywords: Policy games; policy ineffectiveness; static controllability; Nash equilibrium existence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 E52 E61 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mac
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Journal Article: Tinbergen and Theil meet Nash: Controllability in policy games (2006)
Working Paper: Tinbergen and Theil Meet Nash: Controllability in Policy Games (2005)
Working Paper: TINBERGEN AND THEIL MEET NASH: CONTROLLABILITY IN POLICY GAMES (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fem:femwpa:2005.132
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