Optimal Patentability Requirements with Fragmented Property Rights

Vincenzo Denicolo' () and Christine Halmenschlager

No 98051, Institutions and Markets Papers from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)

Abstract: We study the effect of the fragmentation of intellectual property rights on optimal patent design. The major finding is that when several complementary innovative components must be assembled to operate a new technology, the patentability requirements should be stronger than in the case of stand-alone innovation. This reduces the fragmentation of intellectual property, which is socially costly. However, to preserve the incentives to innovate, if a patent is granted the strength of protection should be generally higher than in the stand-alone case.

Keywords: Research; and; Development/Tech; Change/Emerging; Technologies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 52
Date: 2010-11
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/98051/files/NDL2010-134.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Optimal Patentability Requirements with Fragmented Property Rights (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:feemim:98051

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.98051

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