Optimal Patentability Requirements with Fragmented Property Rights

Vincenzo Denicolo' () and Christine Halmenschlager

No 2010.134, Working Papers from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei

Abstract: We study the effect of the fragmentation of intellectual property rights on optimal patent design. The major finding is that when several complementary innovative components must be assembled to operate a new technology, the patentability requirements should be stronger than in the case of stand-alone innovation. This reduces the fragmentation of intellectual property, which is socially costly. However, to preserve the incentives to innovate, if a patent is granted the strength of protection should be generally higher than in the stand-alone case.

Keywords: Intellectual Property Rights; Fragmentation; Patent Requirements (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O3 O34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ino, nep-ipr, nep-pr~, nep-reg and nep-tid
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Working Paper: Optimal Patentability Requirements with Fragmented Property Rights (2010)
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