An Attempt to Disperse the Italian Interlocking Directorship Network: Analyzing the Effects of the 2011 Reform

Carlo Drago, Roberto Ricciuti and Paolo Santella

No 230584, Economy and Society from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)

Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to analyze the effects on the Italian directorship network of the corporate governance reform that was introduced in Italy in 2011 to prevent interlocking directorships in the financial sector. Interlocking directorships are important communication channels among companies and may have anticompetitive effect. We apply community detection techniques to the analysis of the networks in 2009 and 2012 to ascertain the effect of the reform. We find that, although the number of interlocking directorships decreases in 2012, the reduction takes place mainly at the periphery of the network whereas the network core is stable, allowing the most connected companies to keep their strategic position.

Keywords: Financial; Economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 39
Date: 2016-02-01
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/230584/files/NDL2015-082.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: An Attempt to Disperse the Italian Interlocking Directorship Network: Analyzing the Effects of the 2011 Reform (2015)
Working Paper: An Attempt to Disperse the Italian Interlocking Directorship Network: Analyzing the Effects of the 2011 Reform (2015)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:feemso:230584

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.230584

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Economy and Society from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by AgEcon Search ().