LAW AND FINANCE

Rafael Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny

No 294393, Harvard Institute for International Development (HIID) Papers from Harvard University, Kennedy School of Government

Abstract: This paper examines legal rules covering protection of corporate shareholders and creditors, the origin of these rules, and the quality of their enforcement in 49 countries. The results show that common law countries generally have the best, and French civil law countries the worst, legal protections of investors, with German and Scandinavian civil law countries located in the middle. We also find that concentration of ownership of shares in the largest public companies is negatively related to investor protections, consistent with the hypothesis that small, diversified shareholders are unlikely to be important in countries that fail to protect their rights.

Keywords: Financial Economics; Political Economy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 69
Date: 1997-03
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (91)

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https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/294393/files/harvard036.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Law and Finance (1998)
Working Paper: Law and Finance (1998)
Working Paper: Law and Finance (1996)
Working Paper: Law and Finance (1996)
Working Paper: Law and Finance
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:hariid:294393

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.294393

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