Law and Finance

Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes (), Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny

Scholarly Articles from Harvard University Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper examines legal rules covering protection of corporate shareholders and creditors, the origin of these rules, and the quality of their enforcement in 49 countries. The results show that common†law countries generally have the strongest, and french civil law countries the weakest, legal protections of investors, with German†-and Scandinavian†-civil†law countries located in the middle. We also find that concentration of ownership of shares in the largest public companies is negatively related to investor protections, consistent with the hypothesis that small, diversified share†holders are unlikely to be important in countries that fail to protect their rights.

Date: 1998
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5251)

Published in Journal of Political Economy -Chicago-

Downloads: (external link)
http://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/3451310/Shleifer_LawFinance.pdf (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 404 Not found (http://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/3451310/Shleifer_LawFinance.pdf [301 Moved Permanently]--> https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/3451310/Shleifer_LawFinance.pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Law and Finance (1998)
Working Paper: LAW AND FINANCE (1997)
Working Paper: Law and Finance (1996)
Working Paper: Law and Finance (1996)
Working Paper: Law and Finance
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hrv:faseco:3451310

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Scholarly Articles from Harvard University Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Office for Scholarly Communication ().