The Consequences of Co-benefits for the Efficient Design of Carbon Sequestration Programs

Hongli Feng and Catherine L. Kling

No 18415, Hebrew University of Jerusalem Archive from Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Abstract: In this paper, we study the social efficiency of private carbon markets that include trading in agricultural soil carbon sequestration when there are significant co-benefits (positive environmental externalities) associated with the practices that sequester carbon. Likewise, we investigate the efficiency of government-run conservation programs that are designed to promote a broad array of environmental attributes (both carbon sequestration and its co-benefits) for the supply of carbon. Finally, policy design and efficiency issues associated with the potential interplay between a private carbon market and a government conservation program are studied. Empirical analyses for an area that represents a significant potential source of carbon sequestration and its associated co-benefits illustrate the magnitude and complexity of these issues in real-world policy design.

Keywords: Environmental; Economics; and; Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23
Date: 2005
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:hebarc:18415

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.18415

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