Lobbying and Political Polarization

Heinrich Ursprung

No 26219, Discussion Paper Series from Hamburg Institute of International Economics

Abstract: Standard spatial models of political competition give rise to equilibria in which the competing political parties or candidates converge to a common position. In this paper I show how political polarization can be generated in models that focus on the nexus between pre-election interest group lobbying and electoral competition.

Keywords: Political; Economy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29
Date: 2002
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Journal Article: Lobbying and Political Polarization (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:hwwadp:26219

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.26219

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