Lobbying and political polarization

Heinrich Ursprung

No 193, HWWA Discussion Papers from Hamburg Institute of International Economics (HWWA)

Abstract: Standard spatial models of political competition give rise to equilibria in which the competing political parties or candidates converge to a common position. In this paper I show how political polarization can be generated in models that focus on the nexus between pre-election interest group lobbying and electoral competition.

Keywords: political competition; lobbying; interest groups; campaign contributions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
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https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/19354/1/193.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Lobbying and Political Polarization (2003)
Working Paper: Lobbying and Political Polarization (2002)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:hwwadp:26219

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