A Remark on Infinitely Repeated Extensive Games
Ariel Rubinstein (rariel@tauex.tau.ac.il) and
Asher Wolinsky
No 275557, Foerder Institute for Economic Research Working Papers from Tel-Aviv University > Foerder Institute for Economic Research
Abstract:
The comment demonstrates several examples of extensive games for which the set of subgame perfect equilibrium payoff vectors of its repeated game with discounting is very different than that of the corresponding repeated reduced normal form game even when the discount factor is close to 1. Nevertheless, it is true that with a "dimensionality" condition (ala Fudenberg and Maskin (1986), or, Abreu and Dutta (1991) all feasible and strictly individually rational payoff vectors are subgame perfect equilibrium payoff vectors where the discount rate approaches the unity.
Keywords: Financial; Economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 10
Date: 1992-02
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Related works:
Working Paper: A Rermark on Infinitely Repeated Extensive Games (1992)
Working Paper: A Remark on Infinitely Repeated Extensive Games (1992)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:isfiwp:275557
DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.275557
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