A Remark on Infinitely Repeated Extensive Games

Ariel Rubinstein () and Asher Wolinsky

No 989, Discussion Papers from Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science

Abstract: Let Gamma be a game in extensive form and G be its reduced normal form game. Let Gamma ^infinity (delta) and G^infinity (delta) be the infinitely repeated game version of Gamma and G respectively, with common discount factor delta. This note points out that the set of SPE payoff vectors of Gamma^infinity (delta) might be different from that of G sub infinity (delta), even when delta is arbitrarily close to 1. This difference can be substantial when G fails to satisfy the "dimensionality" condition (a-la Fundenberg and Masking (1986) or Abreu, Dutta and Smith (1992)).

Date: 1992-08
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Related works:
Working Paper: A Remark on Infinitely Repeated Extensive Games (1992)
Working Paper: A Rermark on Infinitely Repeated Extensive Games (1992)
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