The Value of Information: The Case of Signal-Dependent Opportunity Sets

Eyal Sulganik and Itzhak Zilcha

No 275613, Foerder Institute for Economic Research Working Papers from Tel-Aviv University > Foerder Institute for Economic Research

Abstract: We generalize the economic decision problem considered by Blackwell (1953) in which a decision maker chooses an action after observing a signal correlated to the state of nature. Unlike Blackwell's case where the feasible set is fixed, in our framework, the feasible set of actions depends on the signal and the information system. As we indicate such a framework has more significance to economic models. We show that in this case, contrary to Blackwell's well-known result, more information may be disadvantageous. We derive conditions for this general model which guarantee that more information is beneficial.

Keywords: Financial; Economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22
Date: 1996-01
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https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/275613/files/TEL-AVIV-FSWP-250.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: The value of information: The case of signal-dependent opportunity sets (1997)
Working Paper: The value of Information: the Case of Signal-Dependent Opportunity Sets (1996)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:isfiwp:275613

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.275613

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