The value of Information: the Case of Signal-Dependent Opportunity Sets

E. Sulganik and Itzhak Zilcha

Working Papers from Tel Aviv

Abstract: We generalize the economic decision problem considered by Blackwell(1953) in which a decision maker chooses an action after observing a signal correlated to the state of nature. Unlike Blackwell's case where the feasible set is fixed, in our framework, the feasible set of actions depends on the signal and the information system. As we indicate such a framework has more significance to economic models.

Keywords: INFORMATION; DECISION MAKING (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 D80 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 15 pages
Date: 1996
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Related works:
Journal Article: The value of information: The case of signal-dependent opportunity sets (1997)
Working Paper: The Value of Information: The Case of Signal-Dependent Opportunity Sets (1996)
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