Incentives, Team Production, Transaction Costs, and the Optimal Contract: Estimates of an Agency Model using Payroll Records

Christopher Ferrall and Bruce Shearer

No 273312, Queen's Economics Department Working Papers from Queen's University - Department of Economics

Keywords: Demand and Price Analysis; Financial Economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 60
Date: 1994-08
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https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/273312/files/qed_wp_908.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Incentives, Team Production, Transaction Costs and the Optimal Contract: Estimates of an Agency Model using Payroll Records (1994)
Working Paper: Incentives, Team Production, Transactions Costs, and the Optimal Contract: Estimates of an Agency Model using Payroll Records (1994)
Working Paper: Incentives, Team Production, Transaction Costs, And The Optimal Contract: Estimates Of An Agency Model Using Payroll Records (1994)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:quedwp:273312

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.273312

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