Incentives, Team Production, Transactions Costs, and the Optimal Contract: Estimates of an Agency Model using Payroll Records

Christopher Ferrall and Bruce Shearer

Cahiers de recherche from Université Laval - Département d'économique

Date: 1994
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Working Paper: Incentives, Team Production, Transaction Costs and the Optimal Contract: Estimates of an Agency Model using Payroll Records (1994)
Working Paper: Incentives, Team Production, Transaction Costs, And The Optimal Contract: Estimates Of An Agency Model Using Payroll Records (1994)
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