Information Sharing and Incentives in Organizations

Jean-Etienne de Bettignies and Jan Zabojnik

No 274646, Queen's Economics Department Working Papers from Queen's University - Department of Economics

Abstract: We examine optimal information flows between a manager and a worker who is in charge of evaluating a parameter of interest, e.g. the value of a project. The manager may possesses information about the parameter, and, if informed, may divulge her in- formation to the worker. We show that information sharing may weaken the worker's incentives and that, consequently, the manager may find it optimal to conceal her in- formation from the worker. Moreover, the manager faces a time-inconsistency problem, which leads her to conceal her information more often than she would if she could commit to an information sharing policy. We build on these results to address issues related to authority in organizations.

Keywords: Financial; Economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 33
Date: 2013-12
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Related works:
Journal Article: Information Sharing and Incentives in Organizations (2019)
Working Paper: Information Sharing And Incentives In Organizations (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:quedwp:274646

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.274646

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