 Job Displacement Risk and Severance PayNo 274664, Queen's Economics Department Working Papers from Queen's University - Department of Economics Abstract: This paper is a quantitative, equilibrium study of the insurance role of severance pay when workers face displacement risk and markets are incomplete. A key feature of our model is that, in line with an established empirical literature, job displacement entails a persistent fall in earnings upon re-employment due to the loss of tenure. The model is solved numerically and calibrated to the US economy. In contrast to previous studies that have analyzed severance payments in the absence of persistent earning losses, we nd that the welfare gains from the insurance against job displacement aorded by severance pay are sizable. These gains are higher if, as in most OECD countries, severance pay increases with tenure. The result is a consequence of the higher persistence of earnings losses for workers with longer tenure at the time of displacement. Keywords: Financial; Economics (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:quedwp:274664 Access Statistics for this paper More papers in Queen's Economics Department Working Papers from Queen's University - Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC. |
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