Job Displacement Risk and Severance Pay

Giulio Fella and Marco Cozzi

No 1615, Discussion Papers from Centre for Macroeconomics (CFM)

Abstract: This paper is a quantitative, equilibrium study of the insurance role of severance pay when workers face displacement risk and markets are incomplete. A key feature of our model is that, in line with an established empirical literature, job displacement entails a persistent fall in earnings upon re-employment due to the loss of tenure. The model is solved numerically and calibrated to the US economy. In contrast to previous studies that have analyzed severance payments in the absence of persistent earning losses, we find that the welfare gains from the insurance against job displacement afforded by severance pay are sizable.

Keywords: Severance Payments; Incomplete Markets; Welfare (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D52 D58 E24 J65 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 40 pages
Date: 2016-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mac
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (19)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Job displacement risk and severance pay (2016)
Working Paper: Job displacement risk and severance pay (2016)
Working Paper: Job Displacement Risk and Severance Pay (2016)
Working Paper: Job Displacement Risk and Severance Pay (2016)
Working Paper: Job Displacement Risk And Severance Pay (2015)
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