Implementing the Efficient Auction: Initial Results from the Lab

Michael Margolis and Jason Shogren

No 10733, Discussion Papers from Resources for the Future

Abstract: The efficient auction is designed to induce truthful bidding for bidders with affiliated values. Herein we implement the auction in the lab, and observe that inexperienced people can bid systematically in this more complex environment, albeit yielding a flatter bid function than the truthful one.

Keywords: Financial; Economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 27
Date: 2003
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https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/10733/files/dp030063.pdf (application/pdf)

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Journal Article: Implementing the efficient auction: initial results from the lab (2004)
Working Paper: Implementing the Efficient Auction: Initial Results from the Lab (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:rffdps:10733

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.10733

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