Implementing the Efficient Auction: Initial Results from the Lab

Jason Shogren and Michael Margolis ()

RFF Working Paper Series from Resources for the Future

Abstract: The efficient auction is designed to induce truthful bidding for bidders with affiliated values. Herein we implement the auction in the lab, and observe that inexperienced people can bid systematically in this more complex environment, albeit yielding a flatter bid function than the truthful.

Keywords: Key Words: auction; affiliation; experiments; valuation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C9 D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-12-15
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
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Journal Article: Implementing the efficient auction: initial results from the lab (2004)
Working Paper: Implementing the Efficient Auction: Initial Results from the Lab (2003)
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