Participation games and international environmental agreements: a nonparametric model

Larry Karp and Leo Simon

No 123717, CUDARE Working Papers from University of California, Berkeley, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics

Abstract: We examine the size of stable coalitions in a participation game that has been used to model international environmental agreements, cartel formation, R&D spillovers, and monetary policy. The literature to date has relied on parametric examples; based on these examples, a consensus has emerged that in this kind of game, the equilibrium coalition size is small, except possibly when the potential benefits of cooperation are also small. In this paper, we develop a non-parametric approach to the problem, and demonstrate that the conventional wisdom is not robust. In a general setting, we identify conditions under which the equilibrium coalition size can be large even when potential gains are large. Contrary to previously examined leading special cases, we show that reductions in marginal abatement costs in an international environmental game can increase equilibrium membership, and we provide a measure of the smallest reduction in costs needed to support a coalition of arbitrary size.

Keywords: Environmental; Economics; and; Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 44
Date: 2012-01-13
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Participation games and international environmental agreements: A non-parametric model (2013)
Working Paper: Participation Games and international environmental agreements: a nonparametric model (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:ucbecw:123717

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.123717

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