A Global Game with Strategic Substitutes and Complements

Larry Karp, In Ho Lee and Robin Mason

No 25014, CUDARE Working Papers from University of California, Berkeley, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics

Abstract: We study a global game in which actions are strategic complements over some region and strategic substitutes over another region. An agent's payoff depends on a market fundamental and the actions of other agents. If the degree of congestion is sufficiently large, agents' strategies are non-monotonic in their signal about the market fundamental. In this case, a signal that makes them believe that the market fundamental is more favorable for an action may make them less likely to take the action, because of the risk of overcrowding.

Keywords: International; Relations/Trade (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23
Date: 2003
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/25014/files/wp030940.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: A global game with strategic substitutes and complements (2007)
Working Paper: A global game with strategic substitutes and complements (2003)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:ucbecw:25014

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.25014

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CUDARE Working Papers from University of California, Berkeley, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by AgEcon Search ().