Controlling a Stock Pollutant with Endogenous Abatement Capital and Asymmetric Information

Larry Karp and Jiangfeng Zhang

No 25071, CUDARE Working Papers from University of California, Berkeley, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics

Abstract: Non-strategic firms with rational expectations make investment and emissions decisions. The investment rule depends on firms' beliefs about future emissions policies. We compare emissions taxes and quotas when the (strategic) regulator and (nonstrategic) firms have asymmetric information about abatement costs, and all agents use Markov Perfect decision rules. Emissions taxes create a secondary distortion at the investment stage, unless a particular condition holds; emissions quotas do not create a secondary distortion. We solve a linear-quadratic model calibrated to represent the problem of controlling greenhouse gasses. The endogeneity of abatement capital favors taxes, and it increases abatement.

Keywords: Environmental; Economics; and; Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 38
Date: 2002
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Working Paper: Controlling a Stock Pollutant with Endogenous Abatement Capital and Asymmetric Information (2002)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:ucbecw:25071

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.25071

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