When Promoters Like Scalpers
Larry S. Karp and
No 25087, CUDARE Working Papers from University of California, Berkeley, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics
If a monopoly supplies a perishable good, such as tickets to a performance, and is unable to price discriminate within a period, the monopoly may benefit from the potential entry of resellers. If the monopoly attempts to intertemporally price discriminate, the equilibrium in the game among buyers is indeterminate when the resellers are not allowed to enter, and the monopoly's problem is not well defined. An arbitrarily small amount of heterogeneity of information among the buyers leads to a unique equilibrium. We show how the potential entry of resellers alters this equilibrium.
Keywords: Demand and Price Analysis; Industrial Organization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Journal Article: When Promoters Like Scalpers (2005)
Working Paper: When Promoters Like Scalpers (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:ucbecw:25087
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