Dynamic Quotas with Learning

Larry Karp and Christopher Costello

No 6245, CUDARE Working Papers from University of California, Berkeley, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics

Abstract: We study the optimal quota sequence, in a stationary environment, where a regulator and a non-strategic firm have asymmetric information, The regulator is able to learn about the unknown cost parameter by using a quota that is slack with positive probability, It is never optimal for the regulator to learn gradually, In the first period, he either ignores the possibility of learning, or he tries to improve his information, Regardless of the outcome in the first period, he never experiments in subsequent periods.

Keywords: International; Relations/Trade (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 18
Date: 2000
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Working Paper: Dynamic Quotas with Learning (2000)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:ucbecw:6245

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.6245

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