Limited Cooperation in International Environmental Agreements

Larry Karp and Sandeep Sacheti

No 6286, CUDARE Working Papers from University of California, Berkeley, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics

Abstract: Governments' desire to ameliorate environmental problems may conflict with other goals. Policy levels which balance different objectives can be altered by policy changes in other countries. A decrease in the importance of the pollution problem, or an increase in its global extent, increase the likelihood that tighter environmental regulations in one region induce laxer policies elsewhere. The transboundary character and the importance of environmental externalities also affect the amount of cooperation needed to improve members' welfare in a coalition. More global pollution problems require a larger coalition. However, the critical coalition size may be larger or smaller for more severe problems.

Keywords: Environmental Economics and Policy; International Relations/Trade (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 35
Date: 1996
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/6286/files/wp960763.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Limited Cooperation in International Environmental Agreements (1996)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:ucbecw:6286

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.6286

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CUDARE Working Papers from University of California, Berkeley, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by AgEcon Search ().