LOCAL GOVERNMENT BEHAVIOR AND PROPERTY RIGHTS FORMATION IN RURAL CHINA
Loren Brandt (),
Scott Rozelle and
Matthew A. Turner
No 11988, Working Papers from University of California, Davis, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics
We examine the ongoing transition from centrally planned to market agriculture in rural China. In particular, we examine the devolution of land rights from village governments to villagers and the corresponding evolution of tenure security in agricultural land. We find econometric support for the statistical and economic importance of four explanations for local government behavior. Three of these explanations indicate a link between the incentives and con-straints faced by village leaders and property rights in agricultural land, and hence suggest policy levers to encourage more secure property rights.
Keywords: Land Economics/Use; Public Economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Journal Article: Local Government Behavior and Property Right Formation in Rural China (2004)
Working Paper: Local Government Behavior and Property Right Formation in Rural China (2002)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:ucdavw:11988
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