Local Government Behavior and Property Right Formation in Rural China
Loren Brandt (),
Scott Rozelle and
Matthew Turner ()
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 2004, vol. 160, issue 4, 627-662
Secure land tenure is important to the development process, but China's rural reforms have so far failed to provide farm households with this security. We examine the political economy of land tenure and find that local governments sacrifice tenure security in the interests of efficiency and equity. Local rent seeking also plays an important role, and is a likely source of the under-development of land rental markets. Our results further suggest that decreases in distortionary taxes and increases in the integrity of elections will lead to more secure tenure and an increased reliance on market land exchange.
JEL-codes: R52 Q13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (38) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
https://www.mohrsiebeck.com/en/article/local-gover ... 16280932456042776032
Fulltext access is included for subscribers to the printed version.
Working Paper: LOCAL GOVERNMENT BEHAVIOR AND PROPERTY RIGHTS FORMATION IN RURAL CHINA (2002)
Working Paper: Local Government Behavior and Property Right Formation in Rural China (2002)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(200412)160:4_627:lgbapr_2.0.tx_2-x
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
Mohr Siebeck GmbH & Co. KG, P.O.Box 2040, 72010 Tübingen, Germany
Access Statistics for this article
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) is currently edited by Gerd Mühlheußer and Bayer, Ralph-C
More articles in Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) from Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Thomas Wolpert ().