Does Transparency Reduce Corruption?

Octavian Strimbu and Patrick Gonzalez ()

No 158368, Working Papers from University of Laval, Center for Research on the Economics of the Environment, Agri-food, Transports and Energy (CREATE)

Abstract: Does a better monitoring (transparency) of officials lowers the incidence of corruption ? Using a common agency game with imperfect information, we show that the answer depends on the measure of corruption that one uses. More transparency lowers the prevalence of corruption but it may raise the average bribe as it motivates the corruptor to bid more aggressively for the agent’s favour. We show that transparency affects the prevalence of corruption at the margin through a competitive effect and an efficiency effect.

Keywords: Public; Economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23
Date: 2013-10
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Working Paper: Does Transparency Reduce Corruption ? (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:ulavwp:158368

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.158368

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