Does Transparency Reduce Corruption ?

Octavian Strimbu and Patrick Gonzalez (pgon@ecn.ulaval.ca)

Cahiers de recherche CREATE from CREATE

Abstract: Does a better monitoring (transparency) of officials lowers the incidence of corruption ? Using a common agency game with imperfect information, we show that the answer depends on the measure of corruption that one uses. More transparency lowers the prevalence of corruption but it may raise the average bribe as it motivates the corruptor to bid more aggressively for the agent’s favour. We show that transparency affects the prevalence of corruption at the margin through a competitive effect and an efficiency effect.

Keywords: Corruption; Transparency; Common Agency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D73 D80 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta and nep-mic
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lvl:creacr:2013-5

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