Reputation Effects in Dynamic Games

Martin Cripps

No 268363, Economic Research Papers from University of Warwick - Department of Economics

Abstract: The solution of a reputational equilibrium is given for a class of linear, quadratic, gaussian dynamic games with noisy control. Although there is imperfect monitoring, a sequential equilibrium is found where the uninformed agents always smoothly learn the type of the informed agent, there is no sudden switch in agents' strategies; a common feature of reputation models. Reputation effects are temporary in the infinite horizon case for positive discount rates, as the discount factor tends to unity there is a permanent reputation.

Keywords: Public Economics; Research Methods/Statistical Methods (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28
Date: 1989-10-10
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/268363/files/twerp329.pdf (application/pdf)
https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/268363/files/twerp329.pdf?subformat=pdfa (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: REPUTATION EFFECTS IN DYNAMIC GAMES (1989)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:uwarer:268363

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.268363

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Economic Research Papers from University of Warwick - Department of Economics
Bibliographic data for series maintained by AgEcon Search ().