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REPUTATION EFFECTS IN DYNAMIC GAMES

Martin Cripps

The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) from University of Warwick, Department of Economics

Abstract: The solution of a reputational equilibrium is given for a class of linear, quadratic, gaussian dynamic games with noisy control. Although there is imperfect monitoring, a sequential equilibrium is found where the uninformed agents always smoothly learn the type of the informed agent, there is no sudden switch in agents' strategies ; a common feature of reputational models. Reputation effects are temporary in the infinite horizon case for positive discount rates, as the discount factor tends to unity there is a permanent reputation.

Keywords: games; discount; microeconomics; economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23 pages
Date: 1989
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https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/w ... 89-1994/twerp329.pdf

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Working Paper: Reputation Effects in Dynamic Games (1989) Downloads
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