Can Green Lobbies Replace a World Environmental Organization?
Paola Conconi ()
No 269300, Economic Research Papers from University of Warwick - Department of Economics
We employ a common agency model to examine how green lobbies a®ect the determination of trade and environmental policy in two large countries that are linked through trade °ows and transboundary pollution. We show that, when governments are not restricted in their ability to use trade barriers, environmental lobbying always results in higher pollution taxes relative to a no-lobbying scenario. Consequently, uncoordinated environmental policies are closer to the e±cient Pigouvian solution than internationally coordinated policies. If, however, governments are bound by international trade rules, green lobbies may bias environmental policies downwards and environmental policy coordination is unambiguously e±ciency-enhancing.
Keywords: Environmental Economics and Policy; International Relations/Trade; Political Economy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Can Green Lobbies Replace a World Environmental Organization (2000)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:uwarer:269300
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