Can Green Lobbies Replace a World Environmental Organization

Paola Conconi

The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) from University of Warwick, Department of Economics

Abstract: We employ a common agency model to examine how green lobbies affect the determination of trade and environmental policy in two large countries that are linked through trade flows and transboundary pollution. We show that, when governments are not restricted in their ability to use trade barriers, environmental lobbying always results in higher pollution taxes relative to a no-lobbying scenario. Consequently, uncoordinated environmental policies are closer to the efficient Pigouvian solution than internationally coordinated policies. If, however, governments are bound by international trade rules, green lobbies may bias environmental policies downwards and environmental policy coordination is unambiguously efficiency-enhancing.

Keywords: ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION; INTERNATIONAL TRADE; POLLUTION (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 F13 Q20 Q28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 17 pages
Date: 2000
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Working Paper: Can Green Lobbies Replace a World Environmental Organization? (2000)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wrk:warwec:548

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