Prot-Sharing, Bertrand Competition and Monopoly Unions: A Note

Amrita Dhillon () and Emmanuel Petrakis

No 269382, Economic Research Papers from University of Warwick - Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper studies a strategic aspect of prot-sharing in an oligopolistic industry with a monopoly union. Whenever a uniform prot share exists in the industry, we show that a union that values the per worker remuneration positively, may have incentives to reduce industry employment, decreasing thus total output and causing total prots to increase. Thus, we show that prot-sharing may lead to higher prots for such an industry even if productivity eects are absent.

Keywords: Financial Economics; Industrial Organization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 14
Date: 2001-10-27
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Related works:
Working Paper: Profit-sharing, bertrand competition and monopoly unions: a note (2001)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:uwarer:269382

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.269382

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