Profit-sharing, bertrand competition and monopoly unions: a note

Amrita Dhillon () and Emmanuel Petrakis

The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) from University of Warwick, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper studies a strategic aspect of profit-sharing in an oligopolistic industry with a monopoly union. Whenever a uniform profit share exists in the industry, we show that a union that values the per worker remuneration positively, may have incentives to reduce industry employment, decreasing thus total output and causing total profits to increase. Thus, we show that profit-sharing may lead to higher profits for such an industry even if productivity effects are absent.

JEL-codes: J33 J51 L42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 14 pages
Date: 2001
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/workingpapers/2008/twerp612.pdf

Related works:
Working Paper: Prot-Sharing, Bertrand Competition and Monopoly Unions: A Note (2001)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wrk:warwec:612

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) from University of Warwick, Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Margaret Nash ().